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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
With its longstanding democratic institutions and high levels of contemporary violence, Colombia represents an anomaly 
within Latin America. Using a contemporary historical approach, this article examines the administration of President Virgilio 
Barco (1986-1990) both in terms of its democratic and institutional reforms and national security responses. It discusses 
how the government managed to push for democratic reforms, in spite of the unprecedented levels of violence. It argues 
that despite numerous negative summations of the presidency, both at the time and since, it should be viewed in a more 
positive manner from a contemporary perspective. 
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Resumen Resumen Resumen Resumen 
Con sus instituciones democráticas y los altos niveles de violencia contemporánea, Colombia representa una anomalía en 
América Latina. Usando un enfoque de historia contemporánea, este artículo examina la administración del Presidente 
Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), tanto en términos de sus reformas democráticas e institucionales y su política de seguridad 
nacional. Se analiza cómo el gobierno logró implementar estas reformas, a pesar de niveles de violencia sin precedentes. 
Sostiene que a pesar de numerosas opiniones negativas sobre la presidencia, tanto en el tiempo y desde entonces, ésta 
debe ser vista de una manera más positiva desde una perspectiva contemporánea. 
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Introduction 
Colombia  seems  an  anomaly.
1  Some  scholars  have 
alluded  to  the  country’s  democratic  credentials  and  its 
capacity to avoid the economic crises of its neighbours. 
Colombia stands in stark contrast to many countries in 
the  region,  having  had,  with  a  few  exceptions,  no 
enduring  period  of  military  dictatorship,  caudillos  or 
populist regimes. In the post-Gustavo Rojas Pinilla period, 
it has maintained longstanding democratic institutions and 
a  relatively  competitive  electoral  system,  in  spite  of 
significant challenges throughout recent decades. 
 
Concurrently,  Colombia  has  seen  significant  periods  of 
violence  since  independence,  varying  in  duration, 
geographical location and motivation. Given the country’s 
high levels of violence, it would seem easy to claim, as 
Steven Taylor (2009, p.2) has, that “...political violence in 
Colombia is no new phenomenon, but rather one that 
seems part of its very DNA”. This is too simplistic, and 
avoids the distinctions within the county’s intricate history. 
Instead, this essay shall follow the prudence of Malcolm 
Deas (1997, p.351), who notes that “Colombia has at 
times been a politically violent country”. 
 
It is perhaps too easy for scholars to dismiss the country 
as on the permanent brink of collapse into a failed state. 
To suggest generalisations of Colombia’s past and present 
fails  to  understand  the  subtleties  of  each  period  of 
governance.  The  post-1960s  conflict  has  been  too 
complex  and  changing to enable a concise summation. 
Whilst  over  the  recent  decades  at  some  points  the 
guerrillas have occupied the biggest threat to the state, at 
others this role has been played by the drug cartels and 
the paramilitaries, though agency and drug finances are 
increasingly  confused.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to 
examine administrations both individually and as part of a 
progression,  to  obtain  a  better  understanding  of  the 
changing patterns of Colombian violence, and the precise 
‘times’  that  Deas  refers  to.  In  light  of  this,  the  specific 
                                                           
1 This paper was originally presented for the degree of Master of 
Science  in Latin American Studies  at the  University of Oxford. I 
thank Malcolm Deas, Jorge Restrepo, Andrés Vargas, Alonso Tobón 
García  and  Manuel  Mocosco  Rojas  for  their  help  and  useful 
discussions at various stages of the text’s development. I also would 
like  to  express  my  gratitude  to  CERAC  for  their  resources  and 
general  assistance.  I  especially  thank  Eduardo  Posada-Carbó  for 
his  support  and  suggestions  in  writing  this  essay;  his  views  and 
insights  were  incredibly  helpful.  However,  any  oversights  or 
mistakes remain my own. 
administration of Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990)  has 
been chosen as the focus of this study. 
 
Historical context 
Having  won  the  1986  presidential  election,  the  Barco 
administration  had to  withstand and attempt to control 
one  of  the  most  violent  periods  in  recent  history.  A 
weaker president and political system may have collapsed 
under  such  pressure.  To  understand  the  context  of 
Barco’s  presidency,  it  is  important  to  summarise  his 
predecessor’s efforts at conflict resolution and where the 
‘threats’ to stability came from. 
 
Belisario  Betancur  was  elected  in  1982  and  tried  to 
resolve  escalating  levels  of  violence  with  his  Apertura 
Democrática (Bejarano Avila, 1994). Attempting to bring 
the guerrillas in to the political sphere, he negotiated with 
them through the Comisión de Paz, created in 1982. This 
resulted in the signing of various cease-fire  agreements 
with a number of the armed insurgents, including both 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 
in March 1984 and the Movimiento del 19 de Abril (M19) 
in August 1984. However, it should be noted that under 
these  pacts,  the  insurgents  were  not  required  to 
surrender their arms. 
  
The  main  guerrilla  groups  active  during  Barco’s 
presidency  were  the  Ejército  de  Liberación  Nacional 
(ELN),  FARC  and  M19.  In  response  to  state  brutality 
during  La  Violencia  the  formation  of  rural  self-defence 
groups  was  encouraged  by  the  Communist  Party. 
Founded in 1964, the FARC took its origins from these 
rural,  peasant-based  enclaves  (Pizarro  Leongómez, 
1991).  The  FARC  slowly  grew  until  the  1982  Séptima 
Conferencia, when decisions were taken to urbanise the 
conflict and seek new sources of funding, namely through 
kidnap, extortion and revenues received from the drug 
trade  (Sánchez,  2006).  The  FARC  used  the  bilateral 
ceasefire signed in 1984, which would continue for three 
years, to strengthen militarily and politically. This included 
the founding of the Unión Patriótica (UP) party in 1985, 
which won Congressional representation in 1986. 
 
The  ELN  was  a  Marxist  insurgent  group  founded  by 
Cuban-trained  students  that  began  operating  in  1962 
(Peñate, 1999). At first relatively small in size, it, as the 
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to  become  the  second  biggest  guerrilla  group  in 
Colombia, both in terms of recruits and acts perpetrated. 
 
The M19 was formed in reaction to the outcome of the 
1970  presidential  elections,  when  Rojas  Pinilla  was 
allegedly denied victory through electoral fraud. Having 
gained  notoriety  in  the  1980s  through  various  criminal 
undertakings, it was the 6 November 1985 seizure of the 
Palacio  de  Justicia,  with  a  death  toll  of  88  (El  País,  9 
November 1985), which showed both the extent of the 
group’s force and the severe ineptitude of the army and 
peace process. According to Marc Chernick (1999, p.34), 
this  event  reduced  Betancur’s  peace  efforts  to  nothing 
more  than  “...un  montón  de  escombros  humeantes  del 
edificio público que se había erigido para la justicia”. 
 
Criticism of Betancur’s lax handling of the guerrillas was so 
strong from certain parts of the military that it saw a rise in 
paramilitarism and the first manifestations of the Guerra 
Sucia. Having originally mobilised in 1968 to counter the 
communist  insurrection,  additional  paramilitary  groups 
were formed in the early 1980s to protect the general 
population  from  the  threats  of  kidnap  and  guerrilla 
violence. Not unified under the term Autodefensas Unidas 
de  Colombia  (AUC)  until  1997,  various  groups  were 
influenced  and  funded  by  various  cartel  bosses.  These 
drug cartels began consolidating their power towards the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  The 1984 assassination of 
Betancur’s Justice Minister, and to an extent the Palacio 
de Justicia assault, demonstrates the growing force  and 
resort  to  violence  of  the  drug  mafias.
2  In  this  manner, 
Barco received a country plagued by increasing violence 
from various agents, with the government understanding 
the left-wing guerrillas as the main perpetrators. 
 
Theoretical  approach  and  essay 
structure 
The four years of any presidential term are often complex 
and multifaceted. Thus, given the nature of this essay, it 
will only be possible here to  provide brief descriptions 
and analyse specific aspects of the Barco administration. 
Whilst many  commentators and academics of the time 
passed  negative  judgements  over  Barco’s  presidency 
                                                           
2  More  recent  findings  have  suggested  that  the  Medellín  Cartel 
financed  the  M19’s  seizure  of  the  building  (see  for  example:  El 
Mundo, 17 December 2009). However, it should be noted that there 
is continued debate over this linkage. 
(Mendoza, 1990; Pearce, 1990), it shall be argued that a 
more  positive  summation  of  his  term  in  office  is 
warranted. 
 
This essay adopts a contemporary history methodological 
approach,  based  on  the  consultation  of  key  primary 
sources of the period, such as journalistic articles, Non-
Governmental  Organisation  (NGO)  reports,  official 
publications and memoirs of political protagonists of the 
time,  taking  also  into  account  the  available  secondary 
literature.  Whilst  some  examined  texts  are  significantly 
critical  of  the  Barco  administration,  most  notably  the 
Comisión  de  Estudios  Sobre  La  Violencia  and  Amnesty 
International  publications,  counterbalancing  sources 
including official Presidential documents have additionally 
been consulted.  
 
Section One assesses the nature of violence during this 
administration,  evaluating  the  extent  of  the  threat 
presented by the guerrilla groups, what the government 
termed ‘narcoterrorism’ and the increase in paramilitaries. 
As a point of departure for this exercise, it is important to 
understand  the  dimension  of  violence  that  Colombia 
faced  during  the  Barco  administration.  Section  Two 
examines  the  manner  in  which  the  government 
attempted  to  confront  this  rising  surge  in  violence.  It 
compares  the  measures  Barco  took  when  taking  office 
and contrast them with those in the second half of his 
time  in  power.  Section  Three  examines  some  of  the 
democratic  reforms  undertaken  by  the  administration, 
including  attempts  at  constitutional  reform, 
decentralisation, the  widening  of the political sphere to 
include  new  actors  and  the  outcomes  of  democratic 
elections. 
 
The essay will then conclude that during his four years in 
power, Virgilio Barco managed to steer the country away 
from complete collapse that many perceived Colombia 
was  heading  towards  (Zuleta,  1990).  Instead,  he 
managed  to  weather  the  fiercest  of  ‘storms’.  Before 
leaving power, Barco claimed that “Colombia ha logrado 
superar,  con  éxito,  quizás  el  período  más  difícil  de  su 
historia reciente. La tormenta ha quedado atrás. La nave se 
ha perfeccionado” (Barco, 1990, p.12). It will be the task 
of  historians  to  pass  judgement,  to  which  this  modest 
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Section One: An imploding 
society 
 
To return to Deas’ previous observation, “Colombia has 
at times been a politically violent country”. Coming into 
power  on  7  August  1986,  Barco  faced  one  of  these 
specific  ‘times’  with  four  years  of  high-level  violence. 
Violence, as can be seen in Graph One, was already on 
the increase from 1984 allowing Barco no time to ‘ease’ 
into  office.  Combating  violence,  which  was  critically 
eroding the state’s capacity to uphold the rule of law and 
implement socio-welfare schemes, became the primary 
challenge for this administration.  
 
In 1987 the government funded an independent enquiry 
into  Colombian  violence  and  democracy,  led  by 
experienced  academics.  This  commission  understood 
violence as a collective phenomenon, predominantly the 
result of social factors such as inequality, poverty and lack 
of education. Their conclusions were summarised by the 
phrase: “Mucho más que la del monte, las violencias que 
nos  están  matando  son  las  de  la  calle”  (Comisión  de 
estudios sobre la violencia, 1987, p.18), declaring that the 
armed  conflict  was  only  responsible  for  7.51%  of 
murders  in  Colombia.  The  findings  were  by  and  large 
accepted as the ‘official’ diagnosis of the problem (Deas, 
1999), remaining within governmental circles largely until 
Álvaro Uribe’s presidency. 
 
However,  more  recent  investigations  have  questioned 
this interpretation (Montenegro & Esteban Posada, 2001; 
Rubio,  1999);  Rubio  in  particular  has  argued  that  the 
empirical  evidence  for  the  commission’s  findings  was 
weak. These authors suggest that the rise in Colombian 
violence  should  be  explained  predominantly  by  other 
factors:  the  development  of  narcotrafficking,  a  weak 
criminal-justice system, the range of violent actors and the 
weight  of  agency  in  the  form  of  powerful  criminal 
organizations;  with  such  factors  as  socio-inequality  and 
poverty carrying less explicative weight (Ibid.). Therefore, 
it  is  important  here  to  stress  the  multifaceted  and 
complex nature of the violence in Colombia. As Daniel 
Pécaut  (1999,  p.  142)  has  stated  “...the  extremely 
heterogeneous  nature  of  the  violence  prevents  it  from 
coalescing along a single axis of conflict”. It is necessary to 
seek  precision  instead  of  referring  to  ‘violence’  as  a 
homogeneous, historical phenomenon. 
 
Following the latter diagnosis, this Section focuses on the 
main agents of violence, namely the guerrillas, drug cartels 
and paramilitaries. They led to the increase in violence, 
directly  and  indirectly,  themselves  killing  numerous 
citizens, as well as spreading arms throughout Colombia 
and undermining the judiciary. It is not the intention of 
this Section to assess the historical origins of the violence.
3 
Rather, it presents the extremity of violence during the 
period, when the number of yearly homicides increased 
from 15,672 in 1986 to 24,267 in 1990 (Inter-American 




Graph 1: Homicides rate in Colombia (1985-
2009) 
 
Source: Dane and National Police of Colombia 





The Drug Cartels 
The Colombian conflict changed with the convergence of 
“coca y Kaláshnikov” (Pizarro Leongómez, 2004, p.71). 
The global upsurge in drug consumption in the late 1970s 
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and  early  1980s  was  a  major  factor  in  explaining  the 
increase in the nation’s violence and the persistence of 
high  murder  rates  in  the  1980s.  An  extension  of  the 
violence occurred under Betancur and was passed on to 
Barco, with an all-out war occurring between the drug 
distributors and governmental forces, journalists and the 
judicial system. 
 
Drug-funded  violence,  labelled  by  the  government  as 
‘narcoterrorism’, affected every level of society, becoming 
in reality the greatest threat to social stability in the late 
1980s, in contrast to the findings of ‘los violontólogos’. 
The cartels inflicted countless murders and assassination 
attempts intimidating those who spoke out against drug 
trafficking,  thus  creating,  what  the  Barco  government 
termed, a “ministry of fear” (Office of the President of the 
Republic,  1988b,  p.  25).  They  violently  opposed  the 
extradition treaty between the US and Colombia, with 
the so-called Extraditables claiming “Preferimos una tumba 
en Colombia a una cárcel en los Estados Unidos” (López 
Restrepo, 2006, p. 422). In contrast to other forms of 
terrorism, narcoterrorism had no nationalist or ideological 
aims. It was instead, the pursuit of impunity that saw the 
cartel bosses attack all those who stood against them. As 
the  bombings  of  both  an  Avianca  plane  on  the  27 
November  1989,  killing  107  passengers,  and  the 
Departamento  Administrativo  de  Seguridad  (DAS) 
headquarters on the 6 December 1989, killing 52 people 
and  injuring  over  1,000,  showed:  no-one  was  safe  (El 
Tiempo,  30  November  1989,  &  New  York  Times,  8 
December  1989).  Bombings,  of  which  there  were  a 
further  88  during  Barco’s  administration,  were 
indiscriminate  and  spread  fear  throughout  the  country 
(Pardo Rueda, 1996). 
 
The assassinations knew no bounds, having started on 30 
April 1984 with Betancur’s Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara, 
a strong supporter of the United States of America (US) 
extradition  treaty.  Under  Barco  these  killings  continued 
and soon began targeting journalists as  well as security 
officials.  The  17  December  1986  assassination  of 
Guillermo Cano Isaza, editor of El Espectador, showed 
the  cartel  bosses’  intention  of  silencing  journalists  (El 
Tiempo, 18 December 1986). Cano himself had been a 
leading  voice  in  opposition  to  the  drug  trade,  writing 
constant editorials about its negative effects on Colombia. 
Whilst this murder was the most publicised, a significant 
number  of  other  journalists  were  also  being  killed, 
curtailing Colombia’s freedom of speech within this new 
unwritten ‘law of silence’.  
 
Barco  announced  the  launch  of  an  unprecedented 
offensive against the drug cartels on 19 December, which 
the mafias answered with a significant increase in violence. 
This violence included the 13 January 1987 attack on the 
former Justice Minister and then Ambassador to Hungary, 
Enrique  Parejo  González,  as  the  drug  bosses  showed 
their  determination  to  spread  terror  throughout 
Colombia (El Tiempo, 14 January 1987). 
 
The  drug  mafias  infiltrated  and  intimidated  the 
constitutional forces of law and order to thwart the rapid 
administration  of  justice.
4  The  rising  crime  rate, 
corruption and intimidation all served to undermine the 
efficacy  of  the  judiciary.  The  cartels  used  their  financial 
strength in attempts to bribe judges, and if this failed, they 
were very often threatened, and sometimes murdered, 
including Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos on the 
25 January 1988.
5 This particular assassination was part of 
what El Tiempo (1 February 1988, p.1A) termed “un mes 
que Colombia recordará con horror”. This month witnessed 
bombs  in  public  spaces,  assassinations  and  numerous 
kidnappings, such as that of Mayor of Bogotá candidate, 
Andrés Pastrana. 
 
The most impacting effects of the cartels on the political 
sphere  and  their  relationship  with  paramilitaries  and 
sicarios  were  the  assassinations  of  three  presidential 
candidates,  Luis  Carlos  Galán  on  18  August  1989, 
Bernardo Jaramillo on 22 March 1990 and Carlos Pizzaro 
on  26  April  1990.
6  Semana  (31  July  1989,  p.36) 
commented that these killings “...pone los pelos de punta, 
a pesar de la familiaridad con que ahora se trata el tema de 
la violencia”, and Pardo Rueda (1996, p.173) referred to 
the  assassination  of  Galán  as  “El  día  que  cambió  la 
                                                           
4  The  judge  leading  the  investigation  into  Cano’s  death  was  told 
“You know perfectly well that we are capable of executing you at 
any place on this planet.” (Kline, 1999, p. 46) 
5  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  this  dichotomy  between 
corruption or death is  unjust to those who continued to fight the 
cartels  
6  These  killings  illustrate  the  levels  of  force  that  drug-funded 
violence  could  exert  on  the  political  sphere.  Recent  research  has 
shown  that  cartel-funded  paramilitaries  were  responsible  for  the 
Jaramillo’s  assassination  (Dudley,  2006),  and  paramilitary  leader 
Carlos  Castaño  confessed  his  involvement  with  Pablo  Escobar  in 
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historia”.  Galán  had  been  the  favourite  to  win  the 
presidential election and his death had a dramatic impact 
on  Colombian  politics.  Barco  himself  claimed  that  the 
drug-financed  attacks  posed  a  threat  to  Colombian 
sovereignty, national security, the stability of institutions, 
civil liberties and the lives of the entire population, stating 
that  “El  afán  de  lucro  que  anima  a  esos  delincuentes 
comunes, los ha llevado a ejecutar actos que el mundo no 
sufría  desde  los  tiempos  del  nazismo  y  el  fascismo” 
(Presidencia de la República, 1990b, p.618). 
 
The Barco administration answered this attack with a set 
of decrees to fight the drug bosses (Ibid.), discussed in 
Section Two, which the cartels responded to by declaring 
“total and absolute war” on all who had persecuted them 
(New York Times, 25 August 1989). This ‘war’ would 
continue beyond the end of Barco’s term. 
 
Guerrilla activity 
The  1980s  were  largely  a  decade  of  expansion, 
consolidation and fortification for the ELN and FARC. The 
ceasefire agreed during the Betancur administration was 
used by the insurgents to both increase their numbers in 
troops and frentes. The process lacked clear mechanisms 
for the verification of the ceasefire and did not force the 
guerrillas  to  lay  down  their  weapons.  More  recent 
revelations  underline  the  fact  that  the  FARC  had  no 
intention  of  fulfilling  their  discourse  of  democratic 
reformism,  instead  remaining  maximalist,  intent  on  a 
military victory, perceiving “a truce [as]...a form of war 
and not a form of peace” (IISS, 2010, p.29) 
 
These  groups  also  both  extended  their  territorial 
presence,  aiming  to  further  destabilise  the  Colombian 
State through increased urban penetration, and the FARC 
heightened  their  involvement  within  the  drug  trade  in 
search  of  greater  financial  income  during  Barco’s 
government.
7 
In Barco’s first year in office the FARC largely continued 
the ceasefire signed with Betancur, with only a number of 
open  confrontations  with  state  forces.  The  M19  and 
Ejército  Popular  de  Liberación  (EPL)  had  both  broken 
                                                           
7  Whilst  the  FARC  leadership  had  previously  declared  their 
disapproval of the taxation of coca growers and farmers at the 1982 
Séptima  Conferencia,  as  they  represented  a  vital  constituency  of 
potential support for the FARC’s cause, once the financial benefits 
of  involvement  in  the  drug  trade  became  apparent  this 
preoccupation soon disappeared (IISS, 2010). 
previous peace agreements, and the ELN continued with 
its violent offensive. For example, on 21 November 1986 
the ELN attacked villages in Antioquia and Bolivar, killing 
17 people, in what was described as “...una de las más 
violentas  ofensivas  de  los  últimos  años”  (El  Tiempo,  22 
November 1986, p.1A). 
 
The government had to combat what Semana termed ‘la 
Petro-Guerra’.  This  was  the  third  tactic  that  the  ELN 
added to their strategy of ‘guerrilla warfare’. In addition to 
their  campaign  of  attacks  and  kidnap,  Barco  had  to 
contend with a rising tide in the bombing of economic 
targets, most notably oil pipelines. Between the 1 January 
1986 and the 5 June 1989, 104 attacks were carried out 
on various elements of oil-sector infrastructure, with the 
50 attacks in 1988  alone  costing the government over 
$260million in un-exported oil (Semana, 27 July 1989). 
 
The ELN maintained their attacks throughout the rest of 
Barco’s time in office. The 13 September 1988 killing of 
three policemen and injuring of four civilians at a village 
celebration  in  Zaragoza  (El  Tiempo,  13  September 
1988), was just one of many that continually occurred. 
 
By November 1987 the FARC had decisively broken the 
official  ceasefire.  The  continued  attacks  on  the  FARC-
backed  UP  political  party  saw  violent  retaliation  against 
various state organisations, especially the army  and the 
police.  Both  UP  Congressman  Braulio  Herrera  and 
Barco’s peace adviser Carlos Ossa, felt that various senior 
army officers were attempting to end the peace process 
and  demonstrate  that  only  a  military  solution  would 
successfully conclude the armed conflict (El Mundo, 14 
November 1986). 
 
The  FARC  and  ELN  began  increasing  their  funding  by 
both protecting various drug plantations in exchange for 
weapons  from  the  narcotraffickers,  and  targeting  urban 
locations,  where  they  continued  their  kidnappings 
(Semana, 14 February 1989). Having grown in recruits 
and  become  better  equipped  thanks  to  their  use  of 
extortion and the FARC’s use of taxation on coca farmers, 
these  two  groups  continued  with  their  campaign  of 
violence  against  public  order  in  the  remaining  years  of 
Barco’s  presidency.  Figures  compiled  by  Semana  (11 
October 1988) in October 1988 showed the potency of 
this threat, within 26 days the ELN and FARC attacked 17 
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Whilst  the  Palacio  de  Justicia  assault  had  significantly 
weakened  the  M19,  they  managed  to  capture  the 
headlines  in  1988,  with  the  29  May  kidnap  of  Alvaro 
Gómez. Gómez, leader of the Conservative party and a 
1986  presidential  candidate,  spent  54  days  in  captivity 
until being liberated on 20 July. 
 
Paramilitarism 
Ley 48 de 1968 stated that civilians could be trained by 
the armed forces or police to protect themselves from 
the perils of the left-wing guerrillas’ insurrection. Armed 
autodefensa groups thus appeared in the 1970s under the 
self-justification of protecting the territory, which they felt 
that  the  state  could  not  effectively  control.  The 
paramilitaries believed that the security forces were not 
combating  the  guerrillas  effectively,  with  paramilitary 
commander, Carlos Castaño stating “...cada día el Estado, 
a través de las Fuerzas Armadas se muestra más incapaz 
de controlar ese avance de la guerrilla. Entonces nosotros 
tenemos  que  ir  marchando  párlelo  a  como  se  vaya 
perfilando  nuestro  enemigo”  (Pizarro  Leongómez,  2004, 
p.120). 
 
With at least 140 groups active in 1987 (Cubides, 1999), 
motivations  ranged  from  protecting  urban  areas  from 
guerrilla threats, to attempting to rid Colombia of the left-
wing revolutionaries, by those who viewed the UP as the 
illegal  political  wing  of  armed  insurgents.  Alberto  Rojas 
Puyo, former UP leader, claimed that the FARC used the 
paramilitary  groups’  UP  assassination  campaign  as 
justification  to  continue  the  guerrilla  war  against  the 
government. It was felt that the UP was merely a ‘political 
instrument’ in the continuation of la combinación de todas 
las  formas  de  lucha,  with  Rojas  himself  stating  “Jacobo 
[Arenas – ideological leader of the FARC] never wanted 
the party to be anything more than something that could 
open up political space for the movement...We were the 
sacrificial  battalion,  so  they  could  justify  their  war” 
(Dudley, 2006, p.95). On 12 October 1987, presidential 
candidate  and  UP  leader  Jaime  Pardo  Leal  was 
assassinated, and on 3 March 1989, new UP leader José 
Antequera  was  also  murdered.  The  message  from  the 
right-wing  paramilitaries  was  clear;  the  guerrilla  groups 
and all those involved with them were being specifically 
targeted. 
 
This message was underlined in 1988, which Semana (27 
December 1988) termed “El Año de las Masacres”. This 
particular  year  saw  paramilitarie  groups  massacre 
uncountable peasant communities suspected of having a 
guerrilla presence or sympathisers. The worst of these 
occurred on the 11 November 1988, when 43 people 
were massacred in Segovia (El Tiempo, 12 November 
1988).  In  this  particular  instance,  armed  paramilitaries 
entered the town and started shooting indiscriminately for 
several hours. Such massacres as Segovia and Ocaña in 
October  of  the  same  year  saw  an  increase  of  human 
rights violations persistently denounced by various NGOs 
(Amnesty  International,  1987,  1988,  1989;  Americas 
Watch,  1990).  Carrying  out  assassinations  through 
sicarios
8 and death squads, the paramilitary groups, often 
acting under the illegal orders of military officials,
9 were 
murdering judges, journalists, and political figures, as well 
as ordinary citizens.  
 
According to a leaked DAS report, in 1987 the Medellín 
cartel  became  the  chief  financial  backer  of  the  death 
squads and illegal counter-insurgent groups. This funding 
enabled the paramilitary forces to hire Israeli and British 
mercenaries  to  train  recruits  in  military  practice  and 
terrorist tactics. As Miguel Maza, director of DAS claimed 
“…los grupos paramilitares, como hoy los conocemos…son 
la interpretación particular que el narcotráfico ha hecho de 
las  autodefensas”  (Semana,  8  May  1989,  p.  26).  The 
particular  murder  of  Jaramillo  showed  the  dark 
relationship  between  Escobar  and  Castaño,  with  the 
Medellín  cartel  funding  two  armed  wings,  the  urban 
sicariato and the rural paramilitaries (Semana, 27 March 
1990). The government now had to confront violence 
from the right as well as the left.  
 
In sum, this Section has outlined the extremely high levels 
of violence that Virgilio Barco was faced with during his 
time in office. A week rarely passed without a report of 
violence  in  the  newspapers;  as  one  contemporary 
headline  sarcastically  stated  “Para  variar...más  violencia” 
(Semana,  8  May  1989).  Barco  was  faced  with  a 
multifaceted violence. With the exception of La Violencia 
the  level  of  violence,  political  destabilisation  and 
victimisation  was  without  precedent  in  the  country’s 
                                                           
8 Contract-killers 
9 The paramilitary groups enjoyed almost full-exemption from the 
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history. Weakened by the rise and range in violence and 
intimidated  by  personal  threats,  the  Colombian  judicial 
system,  National  Police  and  army  were  unable  to  fully 
subjugate all violent actors. 
 
 
Section Two: El pulso firme. 
In defence of public order 
 
Barco’s Guerrilla Policy 
 
“La mano tendida y el pulso firme” was the slogan Barco 
used  to  define  his  approach  to  the  peace  process 
(Bejarano Avila, 1994, p.79).  This phrase illustrates the 
president’s  open  disposition  to  negotiation,  whilst 
understanding that at times force may be necessary. The 
president  attempted  to  change  both  the  structure  and 
programme  of  the  peace  process  of  his  predecessor. 
According  to  Plan  Nacional  de  Rehabilitación  (PNR) 
director,  Rafael  Pardo  Rueda  (1996),  four  dominant 
issues faced the administration in redefining la política de 
paz. First, it was necessary to reformulate the process and 
renew credibility within negotiations, second, maintain the 
truce  with  the  FARC,  which  had  weakened  and  was 
poorly  defined,  and  third,  generate  both  military  and 
public confidence in the new strategy. Finally, the peace 
commissions that  fulfilled the  variety of functions under 
Betancur  were  centralised  around  the  position  of 
Consejero Presidencial Para la Paz, with this role designed 
to reconfigure the peace policy and PNR. 
 
The  second  structural  reform  of  Barco’s  policy 
incorporated  the  development  of  three  concepts: 
“reconciliación,  normalización  y  rehabilitación”  (Bejarano 
Avila,  1994).  The  word  ‘paz’  was  regarded  as  part  of 
Betancur’s  terminology,  with  Barco’s  administration 
understanding  peace  as  more  than  just  dialogue  with 
guerrilla  groups  (Presidencia  de  la  República,  1986).  It 
was felt that opening up institutional pathways to allow 
free  political  and  ideological  discussion  would  de-
legitimise  violence  as  an  instrument  to  achieve  political 
ends.  The  modification  of  the  PNR  within  the 
reconciliation policy was aimed at bringing the State and 
citizens closer, especially within the more impoverished 
and  marginalised  areas  of  Colombia,  where  the  most 
social support for the guerrillas was. 
  
It was important for the PNR to move away from the 
traditional  customs  of  Colombian  politics,  including 
clientelism  and  electoral  manipulation,  and  strengthen 
democracy  and  participation  (more  on  this  in  Section 
Three). The government’s progress in implementing the 
PNR  was  slow,  yet  should  not  be  underestimated. 
According  to  Pardo  (1996),  the  state  increased  its 
presence  and  responsibility  for  essential  public  services 
from 178 municipios in 1986 to 311 in 1989.
10 However, 
by the end of Barco’s period, Pardo (Ibid.) claimed that 
15% of the population and 50% of Colombian territory 
were  incorporated  within  the  programme.  Thus,  the 
PNR had some significant success, especially considering 
the importance that the ‘Violentólogos’ had placed on re-
legitimising the state as the best way to solve the problem 
of the violence. 
 
The kidnap of Gómez Hurtado by the M19 was a turning 
point  in  Barco’s  peace  process.  The  process  was  at  a 
standstill  at  the  end  of  1987  following  the  FARC’s 
breaking  of  the  ceasefire  and  the  intensification  of  the 
guerra  sucia  against  the  UP.  The  kidnap  motivated  a 
significant mobilisation within civil society, demanding the 
release  of  the  Conservative  leader.  Gómez  was 
successfully freed after negotiations in Panama, on 20 July 
1988.  As  Antonio  Navarro  Wolf,  former  M19 
commander, has since reflected “Después de eso se abrió 
paso el camino a la paz” (Iragorri, 2004, p.111). 
 
This affair led to a political debate over how to prevent 
the  destabilisation  of  Colombian  democracy  into 
complete chaos. A process of National Dialogue began 
on 29 July, attended by Gómez himself and opposition 
leaders, although the government itself did not take part 
(El Tiempo, 28 July 1988). The guerrilla hierarchy did not 
attend  either,  as  the  government  refused  to  grant  safe 
passage.  However,  Barco  announced  himself  open  to 
listening to the proposals coming out of the discussion (El 
Tiempo, 28 July 1988). As a follow up, various proposals 
were  presented  by  the  FARC  to  the  Comité  de 
Seguimiento at meetings in La Uribe throughout August. 
                                                           
10 However, it should be noted that this still represented over half of 




Documentos de trabajo CERAC 
Número 15 Página    
 
This process led to an entire re-examination of the peace 
plan. 
 
On 1 September 1988 Barco announced his remodelled 
plan,  La  Iniciativa  Para  la  Paz,  outlining  the  need  for 
significant legal and constitutional reforms to improve the 
state’s means of addressing the prevalent violence. Within 
the framework of the peace process, three phases were 
proposed:  ‘Detente’,  ‘’Transition’  and  ‘Definitive 
Incorporation  into  Democratic  Living’  (Office  of  the 
President, 1988a). This methodology established a form 
of  collective  solidarity  in  order  to  isolate  those  armed 
actors who continued to persist in violence. Additionally, 
eight  governmental  stipulations  were  put  forward  for 
successful demobilisation (Ibid.). The most important of 
these  required  the  rebels  to  both  demonstrate  their 
desire for peace by giving up their arms and cease all acts 
of  terrorism  and  human  rights  violations.  Regional 
dialogues  were  also  to  be  introduced,  to  create 
institutional possibilities for communities to present their 
own resolutions to their violence. Once the procedure 
for  their  incorporation  was  fulfilled,  each  armed  rebel 
would be issued with a pardon in accordance with the 
law. 
 
The  lack  of  direct  governmental  participation  in  the 
Panamanian talks over Gómez’s release was important in 
upholding the constitutional authority of the state and the 
law, and to avoid showing any weakness in the face of 
insurgent  demands.  If  the  government  had  directly 
negotiated with the kidnappers, it would have damaged 
confidence in the rule of law and the democratic process, 
and risked showing that the guerrilla’s resort to violence 
had succeeded. 
 
On 17 July 1989 the M19 and the government signed a 
peace declaration in Santo Domingo, Cauca (El Tiempo, 
18 July 1989). As former M19 commander Navarro has 
since commented, the group had concluded that “...ya no 
era  realista  esa  idea  que  teníamos  de  que  el  pequeño 
ejército comandando por Pizarro, sumado a un alzamiento 
popular, nos iba a dar la victoria” (Iragorri, 2004, p.119). 
This demobilisation increased the credible power of the 
Colombian state,  re-incorporated a guerrilla group into 
the political and institutional sphere and opened additional 
peace dialogues with the EPL, Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores de Colombia (PRT), Corriente de Renovación 
Socialista (CPS) and the Movimiento Quintín Lame (MQL). 
These  talks  continued  under  President  César  Gaviria, 
Barco’s  successor,  until  these  groups  were  also 
demobilised. 
 
In  contrast,  government  efforts  to  negotiate  with  the 
FARC and ELN were altogether unsuccessful. In a joint 
proposal, on 17 August 1988, the two groups announced 
their belief in a political solution to the conflict. However, 
on 22 August 1988 the groups combined to ambush an 
army patrol in what Semana described as the bloodiest 
battle since the Palace of Justice assault (30 August 1988). 
From  this  point  on,  all  negotiations  with  these  groups 
were unsuccessful as their violence increased. Whilst the 
FARC  and  ELN  remained  at  large,  the  opening  of 
dialogue  with  various  insurgent  groups,  successful  with 
the M19, should be viewed as a significant success of the 
Barco administration. 
 
Barco’s Narcotrafficking Policy 
 
In  a  similar  manner  to  his  predecessor,  Barco  initially 
placed more importance on dialogue with the guerrillas, 
than on any other threat to national security. Thus, he did 
not at first present a well-defined strategy for dealing with 
the problem of narcotrafficking. It was not until the latter 
half of his term that Barco publicly declared the violence 
as “... [una] combinación compleja de narcotráfico, guerrilla, 
delincuencia  común  y  terrorismo”  (Presidencia  de  la 
República, 1990b, p.536). 
 
During his four year term, Barco oscillated between two 
separate  drug  policies.  One  was  intensely  militarised, 
whilst  the  other  saw  governmental  representatives 
attempt negotiations with drug mafia delegates. The key 
issue was always that of extradition. Confronted with a 
weak  judicial  system,  the  government  was  reduced  to 
pushing for US prosecution of the narcotraffickers. This in 
turn  saw  the  cartels  launch  an  anti-state  terrorism 
campaign,  in  an  attempt  to  force  the  government  to 
suspend the extradition law. 
 
Whilst extradition was used as the major deterrent against 
the  drug  cartels,  it  could  not  feasibly  be  used  in  each 
individual case. Therefore, it was important to reform the 
justice  system  into  an  effective  tool  to  fight  the  drug 
mafias.  The  government’s  use  of  Estado  de  Sitio  was 
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Reforms such as El Codigo de Procedimiento Penal, passed 
in  1987  (Orlando  Melo  &  Bermúdez,  1994),  and  the 
annual rotation of the head of the Ministro de Justicia, saw 
Barco attempt to decongest the judicial system and curtail 
the  possibility  of  high-tier  bribery  and  the  cartels’ 
influence. 
 
Barco’s  militarised  anti-drug  policy  can  be  understood 
within  four  crucial  events.  First,  in  response  to  the 
assassination of Cano, an “ofensiva sin precedentes contra 
el  narcotráfico”  was  announced  (El  Tiempo,  20 
December 1986, p.1A). This ‘offensive’ was to include 
the  payment  of  rewards  for  information  leading  to  the 
successful arrest of cartel bosses and the use of military 
courts for the prosecution of drug-related crimes. 
 
Second,  as  Melo  and  Bermúdez  (1994)  point  out,  the 
government’s decision on 14 December to continue with 
extradition,  under  Ley  68  de  1986,  in  spite  of  the 
Supreme Justice Court decreeing it unconstitutional, was 
crucial.  This  declaration  would  have  provided  the 
government with the opportunity to renounce extradition 
without  losing  any  significant  political  respect.  The 
question  thus  arises,  would  the  drug  cartels  have 
submitted  to  such  a  weakened  judicial  system,  without 
continuing  their  retribution  against  law  enforcement 
officials? 
 
Third, significant progress was made in the first month of 
the  government’s  ‘offensive’.  The  4  February  1987 
capture of Carlos Lehder, described as “uno de los más 
buscados  narcotraficantes  colombianos  del  mundo”  (El 
Tiempo,  5  February  1987,  p.1A)  showed  the 
government’s determination to eradicate the drug mafias. 
However, it was followed by significant retaliation by the 
cartels, which used violence to intimidate and ultimately 
paralyse  the  judicial  system.  The  murder  of  Attorney 
General  Hoyos  saw  Barco  reply  with  new  antiterrorist 
executive orders. The subsequent Estatuto de defensa de 
la  democracia  included  such  reforms  as:  an  increase  in 
judges and army patrols, the restriction of habeas corpus, 
harsher  sentences  for  those  found  guilty,  increased 
witness protection and plea-bargaining (Presidencia de la 
República, 1990b). 
 
Fourth, the assassination of Galán saw Barco issue further 
decrees as part of his fight against the cartels. The most 
important of these were the suspension of the article in 
the  Penal  Code  requiring  an  international  treaty  for 
extradition, thus enabling “la posibilidad de extraditar por 
vía administrativa, sin necesidad de concepto previo de un 
órgano  judicial”  and  the  entitlement  for  the  police  to 
detain  a  suspect  without  charges  for  up  to  seven  days 
(Ibid. p.536). 
 
The  cartels  answered  with  a  bombing  campaign  that 
would continue for the duration of Barco’s term. One of 
the  only  government  victories  came  on  14  December 
1989 with the killing of one of the leaders of the Medellín 
Cartel,  José  Gonzalo  Rodríguez  Gacha.  This  symbolic 
event,  as  Semana  (19  December  1989)  portrayed  it, 
changed  everything.  Gacha  was,  together  with  Pablo 
Escobar, one of the most powerful leaders of the drug 
mafia, and as such, this represented a significant triumph 
for the state. This victory was internationally praised, with 
US  ‘Drug  Czar’  William  Bennett’s  declaring  “...todo  el 
mundo civilizado le tiene al presidente Barco una deuda de 
gratitud” (Ibid. p.22). 
 
A major positive result of Barco’s policy was the insistence 
on the international dimension of the fight against drugs. 
At key international summits in the United Kingdom and 
the US, Barco managed to persuade European countries 
and,  perhaps  more  significantly,  the  US  to  accept  the 
principle of co-responsibility in the fight against the drug 
trade. It was a considerable achievement for the president 
to make the international community understand that the 
demand in their respective countries and their “...actitud 
laxa y tolerante frente al consumo como a la distribución 
local  de  drogas”  (Presidencia  de  la  República,  1990d, 
p.45)  financed  the  cartels  and  narcoterrorism  in 
Colombia. 
 
The government’s attempts at indirect dialogue with the 
cartel leaders were also important. Whilst narcoterrorism 
continued,  various  governmental  representatives  met 
with  spokesmen  from  the  drug  mafias.  With  Escobar 
having appeared to decide that negotiation was best for 
the cartels’ interests, various meetings occurred in May 
1988.  On  29  August  1989,  drug  lord  Fabio  Ochoa 
Restrepo  approached  the  government  publicly  with 
proposals for dialogue and Escobar published a statement 
advocating  a  legal  path  of  action  to  peace  (New  York 
Times, 30 August 1989). But whilst dialogue continued 
into 1990, the government refused to negotiate, claiming 
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refusing to grant amnesty. The drug mafias took this as a 
lack  of  disposition  to  dialogue  and  therefore  increased 
their bombing campaigns. 
 
Although  it  was  criticised  at  the  time  by  a  number  of 
ministers, it was important for Barco to seem open to the 
drug  mafia’s  surrender,  while  simultaneously  refuting 
negotiation. The government had to withstand the cartels’ 
demands for the end of extradition. Anything less than 
complete  firmness  in  the  face  of  escalating  terrorism 
would have damaged confidence in the rule of law and 
the democratic process, and shown the cartels’ blackmail 




Until  the  end  of  1988,  when  criticism  from  a  NGO 
report  forced  governmental  focus  on  the  issue,  the 
problem  of  paramilitary  groups  acquired  relatively  little 
presidential attention (Amnesty International, 1988). This 
statement is underlined by the fact that the 1 September 
1988’s ‘Initiative for Peace’ was predominantly focused on 
guerrilla demobilisation and the ending of narcoterrorism 
(Office of the President, 1988a). However, there were 
allegations at the time that the government was aware of 
the  paramilitaries,  but  was  content  to  allow  them  to 
continue in the fight against the guerrillas. For example 
Semana  (17  May  1988)  claimed  that  when  the  1988 
peace  initiative  was  launched,  the  administration’s  own 
figures suggested that more citizens had been murdered 
in  1987  by  paramilitary  forces  than  by  the  guerrilla 
groups.  Leading  columnist  Enrique  Santos  Calderón’s 
allegations in 1986 that a clandestine ‘dirty war’ was being 
carried out in Colombia, would seem to concur with the 
suggestion that the government was aware of this issue 
(El Tiempo, 18 May 1986). Indeed, in 1987 government 
minister  César  Gaviria  denounced  the  existence  of  at 
least 140 groups of paramilitaries in congress (Cubides, 
1999). This first official reference to the groups was not 
followed  by  corresponding  measures  to  counter  the 
paramilitary  issue.  It  seemed  that  the  government 
perceived paramilitaries as an inevitable consequence of 
citizen self-defence as permitted by Ley 48 de 1968. 
 
                                                           
11  The  word  ‘response’  has  been  chosen  instead  of  ‘policy’  as  has 
been the case in the previous sections as there was less of a cohesive 
policy  and  more  of  an  irregular  and  relatively  sporadic 
governmental response. 
Having launched an official intelligence operation into the 
issue of paramilitarism, the government instigated a new 
crime plan in April 1989 to eradicate the death squads 
and self-defence groups (Semana, 11 April 1989). Ley 48 
de  1968,  which  permitted  the  constitutional  right  for 
groups  to  take  up  arms  in  self-defence,  was  also 
outlawed,  thus  ending  the  argument  that  these  groups 
were  legal.  In  addition  Decreto  1194  de  1989  was 
issued, stating that prison sentences were warranted for 
those  who  promoted  or  financed  paramilitary  groups 
(Pizarro  Leongómez,  1991).  The  president  entrusted 
DAS,
12  the  single  national  security  organisation  that 
answered  directly  to  non-military  authorities,  with  the 
task of finding those members of the army with close ties 
to the paramilitaries. 
In spite of this, it seems a reasonable conclusion that the 
Barco government saw the guerrillas and drug cartels as 
the biggest threats to the state’s stability, and therefore 
largely diverted its attention away from the paramilitary 
groups. In hindsight this can be understood as an error. 
However, it is important to consider the constant barrage 
of  drug-funded  terrorism,  the  priority  of  guerrilla 
negotiation at the time and the fact that the government 
perceived the paramilitaries as having no motivation for 




This  Section  has  outlined  the  basic  responses  by  the 
Barco government towards what it viewed as the three 
major sources of violence. Whilst some have criticised the 
administration for its inability to dialogue with the FARC 
and  ELN  further,  contain  the  threat  of  narcoterrorism, 
and bring the paramilitaries within the rule of law, it is 
argued  that  a  more  positive  historical  reflection  is 
warranted. Considering the significantly high threat from 
the  drug  cartels,  managing  to  avoid  granting  major 
concessions to the terrorists whilst preventing the country 
from  collapse  and  globalising  the  fight  against  the  drug 
trade, should be seen as positive governmental reactions.  
 
                                                           
12 Whilst recent allegations have arisen over DAS’ role in certain 
political  assassinations,  it  is  dubious  as  to  whether  Barco  was 
aware of these at the time 
13 However, this has since been proved wrong within the emergence 
of Neoparamilitarism and the counter-agrarian reform undertaken 
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Section Three: ‘The winds 
of change’ 
 
In his acceptance speech as presidential candidate, Barco 
(1985a, p.7) emphasised his belief in change: “Soplan por 
la nación los vientos del cambio”. He spoke of the need for 
decentralisation  and  institutional  reform,  and  stated  his 
desire  to  make  Colombia’s  democracy  more 
participatory. This Section poses the question of whether 
this  administration  was  able  to  push  for  democratic 
reforms  in  spite  of  the  extraordinarily  high  levels  of 
violence that the country faced, and to what extent they 
improved the strength of Colombia’s political system. 
 
A  New  Political  Horizon:  Opposition 
Parties 
According to Article 120 of the National Constitution the 
winner of the presidential elections was obliged to offer 
the  second  place  party  “una  participación  adecuada  y 
equitativa” within the new government (Presidencia de la 
República, 1990c, p.17). Barco offered the Conservatives 
three  ministerial  positions,  which  were  refused  by  the 
party’s leaders. During his campaign, Barco had promised 
a Liberal government, thus he was fulfilling a  campaign 
promise. Therefore, for the first time in more than thirty 
years there would be no coalition government with the 
Conservative Party. 
 
Often repeating the phrase “Los males de la democracia se 
curan  con  más  democracia”  (Cepeda,  1994,  p.59),  the 
Barco  presidency  tried  to  open  the  democratic  sphere 
and encourage the existence of an opposition that would 
debate, critique and raise objections or alternatives. This, 
in theory, would help Colombia become more pluralist 
and  competitive,  and  reduce  the  corruption  and 
ineffectiveness of the state. Under the previous system, 
the electorate “votaba pero no escogía”
14 (Presidencia de la 
República, 1990c, p.18); even if they voted against one 
party,  it  would  still  end  forming  part  of  the  new 
government. Under this presidency the electorate were 
beginning to recognise that “...en sus manos descansa la 
                                                           
14 It should be noted how official rhetoric incorporated the diagnosis 
of  those  who  opposed  the  system:  the  logic  of  this  sentence,  if 
applied to Barco’s own election, implies that he himself was ‘votado 
pero no escogido’. 
posibilidad de otorgar un mandato” (Ibid. p.19). Thus, the 
formation  of  an  opposition  to  the  government  gave 
greater  meaning  to  elections,  and  forced  more  fiscal 
responsibility from the party in power. Theoretically, with 
parties  in  opposition  the  government’s  financial  actions 
would be more thoroughly scrutinised, thereby reducing 
the probability of “conductas indeseables” (Ibid. p.19).  
 
However, it is important to balance these comments with 
the  suggestions  of  Francisco  Leal  Buitrago,  who  argues 
that Barco’s desired rejuvenation of the political system 
was not fully achieved. Marginalised political parties, such 
as  the  UP,  under  attack  by  the  paramilitaries,  were 
prevented from fully entering the political sphere by the 
bipartisan and anti-communist monopoly of the political 
system (Leal Buitrago, 1990). The destiny of the UP was 
ultimately tragic. Initially receiving some electoral success, 
with  Pardo  Leal  coming  third  in  the  1986  presidential 
elections, the party saw twenty-four provincial deputies, 
275 municipal council representatives, four senators and 
four  congressional  representatives  elected  in  the 
congressional and local elections of 1986 (Dudley, 2006, 
p.92).  However,  the  UP  began  to  be  increasingly 
decimated by a ‘political genocide’, with military officials 
engaging,  in  what  Amnesty  International  (1988,  p.12) 
termed, a “deliberate policy of political murder” against 
the party. In contrast, while this tragedy took place, the 
government  was  having  some  successes  in  the 
negotiations with the M19, who were later successfully 
incorporated into political life. 
 
Decentralisation 
In his 1985 report on regional autonomy, Barco (1985b, 
p.1)  epitomised  the  traditional  asymmetrical  context  of 
the country’s regions, within the phrase “Autoridad lejana, 
autoridad ausente”. With marginalised areas of the nation 
being those most likely to contain guerrillas, the president 
posited that a new political-administrative map should be 
created.  
 
Through  the  PNR,  the  president  attempted  to  move 
away  from  clientelist  relationships  that  were  seen  to 
dominate  all  levels  of  the  political  system.  As  Angell, 
Lowden and Thorp (2001, pp. 19-20) comment: “By the 
mid-1980s...[c]lientelist  exchanges  defined  both  the 
relationship  between  the  party  bosses  and  their 
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spoils and patronage opportunities in the management of 
the  state  itself”.  Decrees  78-81  of  1987  enabled  the 
administrative decentralisation of various basic services to 
municipality  level  (Presidencia  de  la  República,  1990a). 
These services included basic sanitation, water, housing 
and  health  and  education  infrastructure.  However, 
various  sources  questioned  the  competence  of  the 
municipal governments (El Espectador, 10 July 1988). In 
an attempt to combat this and re-legitimise the political 
system through broader participation, March 1988 saw 
the first election of mayors. This initial election saw little 
change with 859 of the 1,009 municipalities being won by 
the  official  candidates  of  the  two  main  political  parties 
(Angell et al., 2001). However, it was too soon to judge 
what in any case would be a slow process of reform. 
 
One should not undervalue the importance at the time of 
bringing  citizens  closer  to  local  governments.  Barco 
himself highlighted the significance of the elections when 
stating  that  they  would  enable  the  voter  to  both  hold 
members  of  local  government  responsible  for  their 
actions,  and  help  decide  which  public  infrastructural 
projects were most needed within individual communities 
(Presidencia de la República, 1990a). 
 
The  election  of  mayors  aimed  at  strengthening  both 
participation  and  accountability.  Barco  felt  that  if 
Colombians were able to judge for themselves who was 
the  most  appropriate  political  representative  for  their 
municipalities,  the  guerrillas  would  not  find  a  receptive 
audience within rural populations. 
 
It  is  questionable  however  if  decentralisation,  while  a 
democratising measure, was ‘good’ for governability. The 
election  of  mayors  caused  party  fragmentations,  by 
encouraging local alliances which did not follow national 
trends.  Fabio  Sánchez  and  Mario  Chacón  (2006)  have 
suggested  that  decentralisation  might  have  actually 
contributed to the increase of violence, providing criminal 
organisations with easier access to economic resources. 
As power devolved to local governments, certain areas 
became more susceptible to the influence of clientelismo 
armado,  namely  the  use  of  violence  as  a  method  to 
guarantee the appropriation of state resources and funds 
by  criminal  organisations  (Ibid.).  Decentralisation  also 
allowed  the  emergence  of  ‘independent’  individuals, 
capable of election without the backing of a party. Whilst 
this had ‘democratising effects’, it did create problems of 
governability,  in  as  much  as  it  undermined  the 
‘institutionalisation’ of parties (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995.)  
 
The election of mayors aided in the prevention of party 
hegemonies  and  the  monopoly  of  power.  As  Minister 
Fernando Cepeda (1994, p.64) commented in a 1987 
speech: “En los países donde existe la elección popular de 
Alcaldes...el hecho de que partidos que están colocados 
en  la  oposición  ocupen  alcaldías  ha  servido  como  un 




The  Colombian  constitution  was  successfully  rewritten 
and  signed  by  Barco’s  successor  in  1991.  This  new 
constitution was a triumph for participatory democracy, 
and  would  strengthen  democracy  through  changes  in 
opposition  rights,  civil  rights  and  presidential  powers. 
Whilst  signed  by  Gaviria,  it  was  Barco’s  administration 
whose efforts provided the platform for the reforms. 
 
From  the  outset,  Barco  considered  the  best  way  to 
change  the  political  system  to  a  more  pluralist  and 
participatory  democracy.  His  government  attempted 
unsuccessfully to reform the constitution. On 30 January 
1988  he  proposed  a  plebiscite  that  would  abrogate  el 
artículo 13 del Plebiscito de 1957, which only permitted 
constitutional reform through Congress (El Tiempo, 31 
January  1988).  If  it  had  been  successful,  this  plebiscite 
would have enabled the convening of a referendum on 
constitutional reforms. 
 
On  20  February  1988  the  government  and  the 
opposition signed what was termed a “Historico acuerdo” 
at  the  Casa  de  Nariño  (El  Tiempo,  21  February  1988, 
p.1A). This agreement formalised the will of all parties to 
“...permitir que el pueblo soberano reasumiera el poder de 
decidir de si mismo” (Presidencia de la República, 1990c, 
p.39), and would lead to a constitutional referendum on 
9  October.  However,  this  proposal  was  deemed 
unconstitutional by el Consejo de Estado. Respecting the 
council’s  decision  in  his  14  April  speech  to  the  nation, 
Barco vowed to continue in his struggle (Presidencia de la 
República, 1990a). 
 
After a number of further failed attempts at reform and 
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society emerged in support of the constitutionality of the 
18 August 1989 Estado de Sitio measures mentioned in 
Section Two. Approximately 25,000 students participated 
in  a  march  of  silence  on  25  August.  This  popular 
mobilisation would continue on through the movement 
Todavía  podemos  salvar  a Colombia,  until  they  gathered 
more than 30,000 signatures in support of a plebiscite on 
whether to reform Colombia’s institutions. This petition, 
delivered  to  President  Barco,  became  known  as  La 
Séptima papeleta, with the other six cards being used for 
various  other  posts  at  the  1990  election.  This  action 
showed the convergence of public opinion in favour of 
reform. 
 
This  ‘Seventh  Voting  Card’  (Séptima  Papeleta),  which 
asked  people  to  vote  on  whether  a  constitutional 
assembly should be convened to reform the constitution, 
was  deemed  an  acceptable  manner  by  the  Supreme 
Court in which to change the constitution. On the day of 
the  presidential  elections,  27  May  1990,  5,221,992 
Colombians voted in favour of convening a constitutional 
assembly  (Presidencia  de  la  República,  1990).  This 
overwhelming  majority  voted  to  strengthen  and 
modernise  democracy  through  the  peaceful  and 
democratic participation of the people. The decision was 
crucial  in  demonstrating  that  peaceful  change  was 
possible. 
 
The  Séptima  Papeleta  and  the  mobilisation  of  the 
students and citizenry was a decisive force in the change, 
yet  without  the  20  February  1988  or  the  Barco 
government’s  positive  posture  the  conditions  for  the 
reform process would have not been present. 
 
 
In contrast to criticisms that “Colombia is a democracy 
without the people” (Pearce, 1990, p.207), it has here 
been  argued  that  democracy  during  the  Barco 
administration was, in fact, fortified. In spite of extreme 
levels  of  violence,  the  government  enabled  Colombian 
democracy  to  become  more  participatory  and 
accountable. Barco’s establishment of a formal opposition 
was significant; however the legacy of the UP’s ‘political 
genocide’  was  a  tragic  and  lingering  one.  Whilst 
decentralisation  attempted  to  move  away  from 
clientelism, the poor timing of this reform created a new 
armed  form  of  clientelist  relationships.  In  spite  of  a 
campaign  of  violence  and  the  assassinations  of  three 
presidential candidates, the populace exercised its right to 
vote in an attempt to overcome the problems of the past, 
a solution with the people at its centre. 
 
Conclusion: 
¿La tormenta se ha quedado 
atrás? 
 
At  the  end  of  his  presidential  term,  Barco  asked  the 
historian Malcolm Deas (Deas & Ossa, 1994, p.17) “¿Y 
qué tal el veredicto de la historia?” a question to which we 
return now. A number of ranging summations have been 
written with regard the Barco administration, with some 
highly  critical.  Instead,  this  essay  concludes  that  this 
president’s time in office is deserving of a more positive 
assessment. 
 
Whilst  it  is  perhaps  somewhat  easy  as  a  historian  to 
merely use hindsight and judge the administration’s effects 
in  terms  of  what  occurred  under  his  successors,  it  is 
important  to  evaluate  the  actions  of  Barco  within  the 
parameters of his contemporary Colombia.  
In  an  attempt  to  understand  the  violence  plaguing  the 
nation,  the  independent  report  commissioned  by  the 
government claimed that this violence derived from social 
issues.  As  this  diagnosis  was  the  work  of  esteemed 
researchers it was only rational for Barco to trust their 
findings.  This  explains  his  government’s  desire  to  solve 
issues of state legitimacy through such measures as the 
PNR and the local election of mayors. Academics since 
the administration have questioned the evidence of the 
commission’s  claims,  arguing  that  Barco  should  have 
focused instead on the agents of violence, especially the 
powerful  illegal  organisations.  Regarded  within  the 
context of 1986-1990 Colombia, Barco’s policies, whilst 
ultimately not the most appropriate in hindsight, were the 
most apposite, based on empirical evidence presented to 
him. 
 
The  continuous  violence  of  the  guerrillas,  paramilitaries 
and  drug  cartels  combined  to  undermine  Colombians’ 
democratic  liberties  and  civil  rights.  The  dimensions  of 
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as the Avianca plane bombing showed the indiscriminate 
nature of the cartels’ murder campaign. It appeared that 
no  Colombian  was  safe  from  violence.  Standing  firm 
against narcoterrorism, the government showed that the 
cartels would not achieve their ends through bomb, bullet 
or  political  manipulation.  A  governmental  overreaction 
would  have  risked  destroying  democracy,  and  an 
insufficient  reaction  would  have  failed  to  preserve  the 
constitutional authority of both the state and the rule of 
law. Relenting to the mafias’ desires for impunity and an 
end  to  extradition  would  have  encouraged  the  illegal 
organisations to further exploit this perceived weakness in 
authority  in  search  of  additional  concessions.  The 
blackmail of these criminals could not be seen to succeed. 
Considering that outside demand for illicit drugs brought 
in  between  $2  and  $5  billion  a  year  to  Colombia 
(Thoumi, 1995, p.199), governmental insistence on the 
international dimension of the fight against the drug trade 
was also vital. Until this money stops entering Colombia, 
no element of conflict resolution has or will ever be fully 
successful.  
 
When policies are implemented, a number of risks are 
always apparent: are they the correct ones, is the timing 
right and what will be the unintended consequences? In 
hindsight,  it  would  appear  that  some  policies  were 
perhaps not the most appropriate in their contemporary 
context. Whilst the premise of decentralising the state is a 
positive  democratic  reform,  it  was  introduced  at  the 
wrong time. The cartels were increasing in power and 
therefore the threat of ‘armed clientelism’ was significant. 
Weaker  localised  governments,  where  criminal 
organisations operated with relative impunity could force 
the  appropriated  state  funding  into  strengthening  their 
own groups. However, returning to the context of the 
commission’s findings, this policy was understandable in 
light  of  their  recommendations  to  provide  greater 
legitimacy to resolve the violence. 
 
Barco had to contend with issues from previous decades 
which had significantly decreased the power of the state, 
through such manifestations as loss of legitimacy in large 
areas  of  Colombia  and  the  problematic  functioning  of 
political institutions. No rapid fix was available, and thus 
Barco’s administration had to be one of slow reform. For 
example governmental efforts at democratic reform aided 
the civic movement to galvanise the conditions for the 
reform process, enabling a new constitution to be signed 
and for the state to strengthen under Gaviria. It has been 
a  common  place  in  the  literature  to  identify  the 
Colombian political system with the absence of change. 
Under Barco, Colombia did not experience a revolution, 
but it did undergo a process of political reforms that ought 
to be more properly acknowledged. Democracy under 
Barco was made more participatory and representative, 
measures strengthened by the 1991 constitution. 
 
The most significant achievements within Barcos’s peace 
process were with the guerrillas. Whilst the FARC and 
ELN continued to operate, at the end of his time in office 
the  M19  had  demobilised  and  dialogue  with  the  EPL, 
PRT, CPS and MQL was ongoing, eventually reaching a 
successful  conclusion  under  Gaviria.  The  important 
combination of ‘la mano tendida’, after the liberation of 
Gómez together with ‘el pulso firme’ of prerequisites and 
objectives was crucial in the peace agreement with the 
M19  and  their  incorporation  into  civil  society.  This 
successful  result  demonstrated  that  reconciliation  was 
viable. 
Under Barco, not only did Colombia avoid becoming a 
failed  state,  but  the  country’s  political  system  also 
continued  to  undergo  reforms  to  regularly  elect  its 
subsequent  governments.  Just  holding  elections  and 
pushing for political reform in spite of the violence were 
themselves  significant  actions.  This  fact  cannot  be 
overstated:  given  the  dimension  of  the  threat  and  the 
severity  of  the  conditions  at  the  time.  Without  such  a 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
AUC  Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia  
 
CPS  Corriente de Renovación Socialista 
 
DAS  Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad 
 
ELN  Ejército de Liberación Nacional  
 
EPL  Ejército Popular de Liberación 
 
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia  
 
M19  Movimiento del 19 de Abril 
 
MQL  Movimiento Quintín Lame 
 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
PNR  Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación 
 
PRT  Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de 
Colombia 
 
UK  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
 
UP  Unión Patriótica 
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